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WHEN THE LAW PRESERVES INJUSTICE:
ISSUES RAISED BY A WRONGFUL
INCARCERATION EXCEPTION TO
ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
Inbal Hasbani*
What should an attorney do if he obtains information from a client that
would help free an innocent man or woman from prison? In all but one
state, ethical rules require attorneys to keep such information confidential
even as innocents remain locked away in prison. This Comment proposes
the introduction of a new exception to attorney-client confidentiality rules
for wrongful incarcerations.
It begins by providing background
information on attorney-client confidentiality, including lawyers’ duties to
their clients and their ethical obligations under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. It then considers whether a new exception to
attorney-client confidentiality would chill attorney-client discussions, and
whether the reasonably certain death and substantial bodily harm exception
under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(1) should be interpreted
to include an exception for wrongful incarcerations. Practical issues
associated with a new wrongful-incarceration exception are then analyzed,
including the length of conviction after which an attorney would be
required to disclose exonerating information; the proper timing
procedurally for an attorney to come forward; the possibility that a
wrongful incarceration exception violates a client’s constitutional rights
against self-incrimination; and finally, the difference in attorney behavior
that could be expected as a result of a wrongful incarceration exception.
The Comment concludes by suggesting that a discretionary disclosure rule
would best solve the issues presented by a wrongful incarceration exception
to attorney-client confidentiality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is built upon a foundation of liberty,1 a value that is
reflected in nearly every facet of American law and culture. Perhaps in part
because of this fundamental value, the idea of wrongful incarcerations is
particularly repugnant.
In the past several years, two wrongful
incarceration cases have garnered especially heightened media attention.
Both cases involved lawyers who were privy to information that would help
free wrongfully incarcerated men, but were barred from coming forward
because of confidentiality restraints associated with their relationships with
their clients. In other words, these lawyers were bound by the judicial
system—a system Americans would like to believe secures liberty, justice,
and freedom—from freeing innocent men from jail.
In one case, two attorneys, Dale Coventry and Jamie Kunz, knew that
their client, Andrew Wilson, had committed the murder for which another
man, Alton Logan, was serving a life sentence.2 Wilson, who had
confessed to the crime while Logan was being tried, was serving a lifetime
sentence himself for two other murder convictions.3 Unsurprisingly,
Wilson did not authorize his attorneys to disclose his incriminating
confession, and so the attorneys were required under Illinois ethical rules to
remain silent.4 In the face of this ethical quandary, the attorneys, along with
Mark Miller, the attorney representing the alleged co-defendant in Logan’s
case, signed an affidavit stating that they had information from privileged
sources that Logan was not responsible for the murder.5 Wilson gave his
attorneys permission to reveal the exonerating information in the event of
his death.6 Twenty-six years later, after Logan had spent nearly half his life
in jail, Andrew Wilson died, and the attorneys revealed Logan’s innocence.7
Soon after, Logan was released from prison.8

1

See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
Michael Miner, The Greater of Two Evils, CHI. READER, Jan. 31, 2008, at 6.
3
Maurice Possley, Inmate’s Freedom May Hinge on Secret Kept for 26 Years, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 19, 2008, at 1.
4
Helen Gunnarsson, The Conscience of a Lawyer: Your Client Admits He Committed
Murder. What Should You Do? What Can You Do? For Two Illinois Lawyers, These
Aren’t Hypothetical Questions, ILL. B.J., Mar. 2008, at 118, 118.
5
Id.
6
Miner, supra note 2. Wilson’s lawyers have claimed as much, although there is no
written proof that Wilson gave permission. See id.
7
Innocent Man Free After 26 Years in Prison, CBS NEWS, Apr. 18, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/18/national/main4028780.shtml.
8
Wendell Hutson, After 26 Years in Prison, Alton Logan’s Murder Charges Dismissed,
CHI. DEFENDER ONLINE, Sept. 5, 2008, http://www.chicagodefender.com/article-1800-after26-years-in-prison-alton-loganrss-murder-charges-dismissed.html.
2
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Similarly, Staple Hughes, a North Carolina lawyer, revealed his
client’s confession in 2004, hoping to free Lee Wayne Hunt from his life
sentence in prison.9 Hughes claimed that twenty-two years earlier, his nowdead client confessed that he acted alone in committing a double murder for
which another man, Lee Wayne Hunt, was serving a life sentence.10
Hughes claimed that after his own imprisoned client died, he felt it was
“ethically permissible and morally imperative” that he come forward with
the exonerating information.11 The law, however, binds attorneys to remain
silent even after their clients’ deaths,12 and Hughes did not receive his
client’s consent to reveal the confidential information.13 Judge Jack
Thompson of the Cumberland County Superior Court in Fayetteville
refused to consider Hughes’ testimony during a hearing in 2007 in response
to Hunt’s request for a new trial, claiming, “Mr. Hughes has committed
professional misconduct.”14 Although Hughes was referred to the North
Carolina Bar for violating attorney-client privilege, the complaint was
dismissed in January 2008 in a confidential decision.15 Meanwhile, Lee
Wayne Hunt remains in jail despite the apparently exonerating
information.16
The lawyers’ silence in the Alton Logan and Lee Wayne Hunt cases
produces a sense of outrage towards the ethical constructs that are meant to
guide lawyers in the judicial system. The decades-long prison terms of
innocent men force us to question whether the ethical guidelines are ethical
at all. What kind of system allows a man to serve day after day in prison
when lawyers know he is innocent? When the moral premise of the judicial
system is to establish justice, how can the same judicial system require a
lawyer to remain silent as innocent men and women remain in jail unjustly?
The answers, unfortunately, are more complicated than they seem.
Although the end goal of the judicial system is certainly to produce justice,
lawyers’ first obligations are almost always to their clients, in the hopes that
the adversarial system will weed out the truth from fiction and ensure that
justice is served.17 Thus, lawyers arguably represent a means to an end, and

9

Adam Liptak, When Law Prevents Righting A Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, Week
in Review, at 4.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Swindler v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 405 (1998).
13
Liptak, supra note 9.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 210 (citing CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 15
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the means require zealous advocacy on behalf of their clients,18 even in the
extreme case of a wrongful conviction.
However, every rule has exceptions, and attorney-client confidentiality
is no different. In certain situations, the law allows confidentiality to be
broken in order to preserve an overriding value, such as the prevention of
substantial bodily harm or reasonably certain death.19 Similarly, an
exception for wrongful incarcerations could be promulgated as a declaration
of society’s overriding interest in preventing innocent men and women
from serving sentences. However, in introducing such an exception, several
issues are raised that are not immediately intuitive. This Comment is an
attempt to frame some of these concerns and shed light on the issues
presented by a wrongful incarceration exception. Although a wrongful
incarceration exception risks chilling attorney-client discussions and raises
a number of practical issues, such as when an attorney should disclose
exonerating information and whether or not such a disclosure violates a
client’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination, this Comment
argues that a rule allowing attorneys the discretion to come forward with
confidences to help save the wrongfully convicted is worth the costs.
Part II of this Comment begins by providing background information
on the judicial system’s requirements of lawyers, including attorneys’
ultimate duty to their clients and their obligations under attorney-client
confidentiality. Part III proceeds with an analysis of the wrongful
incarceration exception, with seven subparts. Subpart A discusses the
possible chilling effect of a new exception on attorney-client discussions.
Subpart B considers the proposition that the substantial bodily harm and
reasonably certain death exception should be interpreted to include an
exception for wrongful incarcerations. Subparts C, D, E, and F raise
practical issues with a wrongful incarceration exception, including,
respectively: the length of conviction after which an attorney would be
required to disclose exonerating information; the proper timing
procedurally for an attorney to come forward; the possibility that a
wrongful incarceration exception violates a client’s constitutional rights
against self-incrimination; and finally, the difference in attorney behavior
that could be expected to result from a wrongful incarceration exception.
Subpart G concludes by suggesting that a discretionary disclosure rule
would best solve the issues presented by a wrongful incarceration exception
to attorney-client confidentiality.

(1908) (“The Lawyer owes ‘entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.’”)).
18
Id.
19
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE LAWYER’S DUTY

A trial, the Supreme Court has asserted, is a “search for truth.”20 This
assertion resonates easily with intuitive conceptions of what a judiciary is
meant to establish. Since justice is the prevailing goal of a judicial system,
then truth, one would think, must be its unerring companion. But, herein
lies the paradox. Although truth may be the end goal of every trial, the
lawyers playing their parts serve a different end—advocacy on behalf of
their clients—that may very well be at odds with the search for truth.
Although such a conception of a lawyer’s duty may at first glance seem to
conflict with the overlying goal of the judicial system—and in fact, in some
situations it does—the American judicial system is built upon this
fundamental premise in its pursuit of justice.
The legal profession is guided by rules that recognize a lawyer’s duty
as a “zealous advocate for the client, putting that person’s interest ahead of
all others.”21 As far back as 1820, Lord Brougham famously described the
role of the lawyer:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and
that person is the client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all
hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only
duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from
that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be
his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.22

Aside from a few exceptions, the legal profession is built on a standard of
strict attorney loyalty to the client. In fact, despite the conundrum that
lawyers face as being both advocates on behalf of their clients—clients who
may have little to gain from the ascertainment of truth—and officers of the
court “presumably working to advance the truth,”23 the ethical guidelines
often require the lawyer’s duty to the client to be the lawyer’s ultimate
obligation.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which is the
ethical code upon which most states base their ethics guidelines for
lawyerly conduct, do not once “directly reference truth in the provisions

20

Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171 (1986).
Henning, supra note 17, at 210 (citing CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908)).
22
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 71-72 (3d
ed. 2004) (citing LORD HENRY BROUGHAM, TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (1821)).
23
Henning, supra note 17, at 211.
21
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that establish the precepts for the proper practice of law.”24 Devotion to the
client, not truth, is the lawyer’s ultimate duty. Although
certain rules discuss the requirement that lawyers not introduce false evidence,
mislead a third person, or act deceptively or fraudulently . . . nowhere do they instruct
a lawyer—even on representing a client in an adjudicatory proceeding—to ensure that
the result of the legal representation reflects what actually happened in the transaction
25
that is the substance of the dispute.

In fact, the Model Rules go so far as to require the lawyer to cross-examine
a witness, in an effort to undermine her credibility, even if the lawyer
knows the witness is truthful.26 Similarly, a criminal defense attorney’s
mission is to defend a guilty client, even when that defense results in the
client’s acquittal.27 Such advocacy can hardly be framed as a “search for
truth” and may, at times, conflict with the ascertainment of justice. But our
judicial system is built on the notion that a lawyer is a client’s
representative, and together the lawyer and client should create the most
powerful and rigorous defense possible on behalf of the client.28
B. ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

Attorney-client confidentiality has a long history in the American legal
system and was recognized at least by the middle of the nineteenth century
as an ethical mandate.29 A lawyer’s relationship with his client, both as a
zealous advocate and as a gatekeeper of his client’s secrets, has been and
continues to be one of the most sacred and protected relationships in the
law.
Client confidentiality has both evidentiary and ethical components.
The attorney-client privilege, which is the evidentiary doctrine, is the oldest
common law privilege of the various confidential communications.30 The
privilege is premised on the theory that the “public benefit in encouraging
clients to fully communicate with their attorneys in order to enable the
attorney to act most effectively, justly and expeditiously in providing sound
legal advice, outweighs the harm caused by the loss of relevant

24

Id. at 213.
Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3, 4.1, 8.4(c) (2008)).
26
See id. at 217.
27
Id. at 213.
28
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1-1.3, for more information about the
lawyer’s role under the Model Rules.
29
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 130 (citing L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and
the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909, 938 (1980)).
30
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL
§18.03[1] (8th ed. 2007).
25
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information.”31 Proposed Rule of Evidence 503 (also known as Supreme
Court Standard 503), which is commonly used as a guide to attorney-client
privilege in federal courts,32 states that “a client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the client.”33
The ethical component of attorney-client confidentiality, for the most
part, expands on this concept. The Model Rules require a lawyer not to
reveal “information relating to the representation of a client.”34 Thus, the
ethical guidelines require the attorney to keep a wider arena of information
confidential—any information “relating” to the attorney’s representation—
while the attorney-client privilege prevents the attorney from disclosing any
information “made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the client.”35
One of the main guiding principles behind the confidentiality doctrine
is the notion that each member of our society is entitled to the free exercise
of his or her autonomy.36 To that end, each person is “entitled to know his
rights with respect to society and other individuals, and to decide whether to
seek fulfillment of those rights through the due processes of law.”37
Because lawyers have a “legal and practical monopoly over access to the
legal system and knowledge about the law,” their “advice and assistance are
often indispensable” to the effective exercise of individual autonomy.38
Competent representation requires that a lawyer be “fully informed of all
the facts of the matter he is handling.”39 Since clients are not likely to give
full, candid, and possibly incriminating or embarrassing facts to their
lawyers unless they are confident that the lawyer will keep the information
confidential, attorney-client confidentiality is essential for the effective

31

Id.; see, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“Its purpose is to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice. The
privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such
advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.”).
32
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 30, at §18.03[1].
33
PROP. FED. R. EVID. 503(b), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 236 (1972).
34
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2008).
35
Id.; PROP. FED. R. EVID. 503(b).
36
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 62.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 129. (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981)).
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assistance of counsel.40 In fact, the Supreme Court has asserted that the
attorney-client privilege survives even after the death of a client.41
Despite the benefits of confidentiality, it can produce some friction
with the search for truth. As one court put it, “Because ‘the attorney-client
privilege may serve as a mechanism to frustrate the investigative or factfinding process, it creates an inherent tension with society’s need for full
and complete disclosure of all relevant evidence during implementation of
the judicial process.’”42 But courts have acknowledged that this “is the
price that society must pay for the availability of justice to every citizen,
which is the value that the privilege is designed to secure.”43 The “social
good derived from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers
acting for their clients . . . outweighs the harm that may come from the
suppression of the evidence.”44
Although confidentiality is generally upheld, the ethical guidelines
have recognized a few exceptions to the attorney-client confidentiality
doctrine. Model Rule 1.6 outlines six such exceptions, including exceptions
to “prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm”45 and to
“prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another.”46 The Model Rules, however, do not currently have
an exception for situations like Alton Logan’s and Lee Wayne Hunt’s,
when a lawyer knows and would like to disclose that his or her client
committed a crime for which an innocent person is serving a sentence.
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE IMPACT OF A NEW EXCEPTION ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT
DISCUSSIONS

In light of the long history and tradition supporting attorney-client
confidentiality, one of the gravest problems with introducing a new
exception to attorney-client confidentiality is that it would prevent the frank
and candid discussions that are the very purpose of the confidentiality
doctrine.
Confidentiality proponents “contend that confidentiality
exceptions will interfere with the development of client trust and will

40

Id. (citing Linton v. Perrini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1981)).
See Swindler v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 405 (1998).
42
In re A John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 408 Mass. 480, 482 (1990) (quoting In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983)).
43
Id.
44
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Goldman, 395 Mass. 495, 502 (1985)).
45
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008).
46
Id. R. 1.6(b)(3).
41
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discourage clients from using or freely communicating with their
counsel.”47 Moreover, creating a new exception, which would allow
attorneys to reveal client confidences, “puts the profession on a slippery
slope of having to be the judge of which confidences are to be revealed and
which are not.”48 As lawyers increasingly assume the role of deciding when
to make disclosures without judicial oversight or clear guidelines, lawyers
may become more comfortable with disclosure.49 Such a fundamental shift
in the direction of the profession could lead to ineffective representation,
which would arguably violate a client’s rights to effective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.50
Although longstanding conventional wisdom considers confidentiality
essential to ensure full and candid disclosure of embarrassing and
potentially incriminating truths from clients, this consensus is difficult to
prove empirically.51 As Professors Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith
posit, “How would one determine scientifically how many clients in fact
gave sensitive information to their lawyers which they would not have
given but for assurance of confidentiality?”52
Without scientific proof of confidentiality’s effects, many have
doubted whether confidentiality is necessary to enhance client discussions.
For example, Professor Harry Subin contends that if an attorney explains to
his client that the best way to advocate on his behalf requires him to know
all of the facts involved in the case, regardless of confidentiality, she is
“likely to induce the client to disclose them, for nondisclosure jeopardizes
the client’s goals.”53 Professor Lloyd Snyder adds that “clients will distort
facts and withhold information from their lawyers no matter how strict or
loose the rules of confidentiality may be.”54 Then again, clients may speak
candidly for a number of reasons, including, for example, an “urge to
cleanse oneself through confession,” or because of “some subconscious
desire to seek help,” or “the conclusion that one cannot obtain help
otherwise”—forces that operate regardless of a confidentiality rule.55
47

Leslie Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients
Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 97 (1994).
48
Kathryn W. Tate, The Hypothetical as a Tool for Teaching the Lawyer’s Duty of
Confidentiality, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1659, 1683 (1996).
49
Id.
50
Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1127 (1985).
51
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 139.
52
Id.
53
Subin, supra note 50, at 1163.
54
Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorney-Client Confidentiality Necessary?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 477, 485 (2002).
55
Subin, supra note 50, at 1164.
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According to Professor Snyder, “[c]onfidentiality rules can be an
inducement to clients to be forthcoming with their lawyers only if they are
aware of and understand the rules.”56 Since most clients do not know or
comprehend the rules, or the complexity of the exceptions, any exceptions
to the confidentiality rule are unlikely to affect legal assistance.57 Thus, the
promise of absolute secrecy is not necessary in order to promote open
discussion between clients and attorneys.58
In response to such criticism, many studies have tested the effect of
confidentiality on frank and candid discussion of respondents. For
example, one behavioral study found that respondents were five times more
likely to admit to corporal punishment of their children when
confidentiality was clear.59
Similarly, another study conducted by
behavioral scientists revealed that respondents were twice as likely to admit
to undesirable behavior, like illicit drug use, racist attitudes, and racist
behavior, when the methodology assured confidentiality.60 A study by the
Yale Law Journal suggested that more than 50% of lay people surveyed
believed that they would be less likely to make free and complete disclosure
to a lawyer if their lawyer was legally obligated to disclose client
information to another lawyer in court.61 A survey of New Jersey lawyers
conducted by Professor Leslie Levin found that over 65% of lawyers
surveyed informed none of their clients about an attorney’s obligation under
New Jersey ethical rules to disclose client confidences to prevent a client
from committing a wrongful act.62 The reason most lawyers did not discuss
the subject of mandatory disclosure, was “because they [felt] that
discussions about confidentiality exceptions would interfere with client
trust.”63 The violation of such trust led lawyers to believe they would
obtain less than full disclosure from their clients if they promised anything
less than complete confidentiality.64 Although the studies did not test the
impact of a discretionary disclosure rule on client discussions, they suggest
that clients are less likely to make full and complete disclosure when
something less than complete confidentiality is promised.
56

Snyder, supra note 54, at 505.
Id. at 505.
58
Id. at 484.
59
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 140 (citing ROBERT F. BORUCH & JOE S. CECIL,
ASSURING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF SOCIAL RESEARCH DATA 70 (1979)).
60
Id. (citing BORUCH & CECIL, supra note 59, at 71).
61
Notes & Comments, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other
Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J.
1226, 1262 (1962).
62
Levin, supra note 47, at 120-22.
63
Id. at 122.
64
Id. at 122-23.
57
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Professor Leslie Levin’s study nonetheless confirmed some of
Professor Snyder’s reservations that clients are unaware of the complexity
of the confidentiality rules. Levin’s study found that most New Jersey
lawyers did not believe that their clients understood that attorneys may be
required to disclose client confidences in certain circumstances.65 A study
conducted in Tompkins County, New York, revealed that 42% of all clients
surveyed believed that confidentiality requirements are absolute.66 Despite
clients’ incomplete understanding of the ethical rules, Professor Levin’s
study suggested that lawyers believe confidentiality works to promote the
free flow of client information.67 In other words, even though clients may
not comprehend the nuances of the confidentiality rules, they still rely on
their attorneys’ assurances that their communications are confidential to
reveal embarrassing or incriminating information.
Professor Levin’s study also found that discussing disclosure
requirements with a client at the first substantive meeting or when the
lawyer thinks the client might be about to discuss future wrongdoing may
reduce “the likelihood that clients will say any more about the subject.”68
Although warning clients about disclosure requirements “unquestionably
promotes client autonomy” (since clients are entitled to know what is not
protected before they speak), it leads to inhibited discussion, and a
reluctance to speak any further.69 This is particularly disconcerting when
considering the Fifth Amendment rights involved, which require the
attorney to fully explain any adverse consequences of disclosure and the
client to voluntarily waive the privilege prior to any self-incriminating
confession if such confession is ever used in court.70 Warned as such, a
client may decide to keep any incriminating information to himself, even if
he is responsible for a crime for which an innocent person is being
punished.71
If one assumes that clients would withhold information from their
attorneys because of a wrongful incarceration exception to the
confidentiality rules, the introduction of such an exception could in fact be
65

Id. at 122.
Id. at 103-04 (citing Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV.
351, 379 (1989)).
67
Id. at 122.
68
Id. at 125.
69
Id.
70
See discussion infra Part III.E.
71
If, however, the client was never forewarned, or did not waive the attorney-client
privilege, then any incriminating information could be protected under use immunity. See
id. This could very well provide a perverse incentive for the attorney not to explain the
consequences of any incriminating discussions, in the hopes that doing so would save his
client from punishment under use immunity.
66
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self-defeating. As Professors Freedman and Smith note, “Certainly it is
correct to say that lawyers know a good deal of truth. They do so, however,
because clients feel secure in entrusting their lawyers with damaging
truths.”72 The problem is that it is hard to determine just how such an
exception would actually affect discussions. If the wrongful incarceration
exception would affect many cases, or a few prominent ones, then word of
mouth could travel widely, and attorney-client trust could erode over time.
On the other hand, if an exception would affect a small number of cases,
and clients remained unaware of the exception, then perhaps it would not
make much difference at all. Still, relying on the ignorance of clients and
attorneys’ lack of disclosure of confidentiality exceptions to argue that a
new exception would not impact candid attorney-client discussions seems
perverse.
Given the uncertainty and controversy over confidentiality’s precise
impact on client discussions, the ultimate impact of a wrongful
incarceration exception on client discussions may simply be unquantifiable.
Ultimately, the promulgation of a new rule would require lawmakers to
decide that the benefits of freeing wrongfully incarcerated men and women
are worth the possible chilling effects caused by creating such a rule.
Although a new rule could prevent attorneys from receiving the crucial
information that would put them in a position to disclose wrongful
incarcerations, it would afford them the opportunity to do something if they
are in receipt of such information.
B. MODEL RULE 1.6(B)(1)’S “REASONABLY CERTAIN DEATH OR
SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM” EXCEPTION
AND WRONGFUL INCARCERATION

Perhaps one of the most powerful arguments in favor of an attorney’s
right to reveal confidential information about a wrongful incarceration is
that Model Rule 1.6(b)(1)’s exception to prevent “reasonably certain death
or substantial bodily harm” already encapsulates such a right.73 In a recent
essay, Professor Colin Miller argues that the twenty-six states that have
adopted
some
form
of
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) “can and should read an implied wrongful
incarceration/execution exception into their existing rules.”74 The twentythree states without such a rule should adopt some form of Model Rule

72

FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 138.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008).
74
Colin Miller, Ordeal by Innocence: Why There Should Be a Wrongful
Incarceration/Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 391, 393 (2008).
73

2010]

WHEN THE LAW PRESERVES INJUSTICE

289

1.6(b)(1), and read a wrongful incarceration/execution exception into the
rule.75
One state, Massachusetts, already has a provision under
Massachusetts Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(1) that explicitly
permits attorneys to disclose client information to “prevent the wrongful
execution or incarceration of another.”76
Professor Miller argues that incarceration can be analogized to
substantial bodily harm for three reasons. First, compared to the nonincarcerated, “inmates face an increased risk of physical violence based
upon factors such as the concentration of violent individuals, overcrowding,
prison culture, the inability of prisoners to physically separate themselves,
the prevalence of drug use, and prison guard brutality.”77 One national
study cited by Miller indicated that 27% of inmates will suffer from a
physically violent attack, excluding rape, at some point in their
imprisonment.78 Miller also notes that studies which estimate the amount of
violence in prisons are likely to underestimate the problem since inmates
are reluctant to snitch and generally fear retaliation.79
Second, Miller argues that inmates experience heightened risks of
communicable diseases compared to the general population, perhaps
because of “prison overcrowding . . . poor medical screening[,] and
treatment in prisons.”80 The statistics, Miller argues, prove it: “According
to a 2002 study by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care,
the rates of HIV and Hepatitis C infections in prisons are more than five
times and between nine and ten times the corresponding rates in the general
population, respectively.”81 Third, inmates are subjected to an increased
risk of rape. 82 Miller points to a study reporting that 98% of inmates
surveyed were aware of at least one sexual assault occurring in the previous
year.83 Additionally, Miller asserts that the states whose rules allow
attorneys to disclose client information to prevent substantial injury to the
financial interest of another can include the significant financial effects of
imprisonment as part of the harm to be prevented by a wrongful
75

Id.
Id. (citing MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008)).
77
Id. at 397.
78
Id.
79
Id. (citing Jeff Potts, American Penal Institutions and Two Alternative Proposals for
Punishment, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 443, 462. n.126 (1993)).
80
Id. at 397 (citing Potts, supra note 79, at 465-70).
81
Id. (citing 1 NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOONTO-BE-RELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 18 (2002), available at
http://www.ncchc.org/
stbr/Volume1/Health%20Status%20(vol%201).pdf).
82
Id. at 398 (citing Potts, supra note 79, at 471 n.185).
83
Id.
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incarceration/
execution exception.84
Miller argues that because the risk of suffering from substantial bodily
harm in prison is commensurate with the risks faced by intended victims in
situations where we already permit Rule 1.6(b)(1) disclosures, lawyers
should be just as able to come forward under the current exception to
prevent an intended victim from suffering as they would for an innocent
person’s wrongful incarceration.85 Miller’s argument is compelling
particularly when considering the real dangers presented by incarceration.
However, he overlooks some holes in the substantial bodily harm exception
that would likely present problems for attorneys hoping to disclose
information about wrongful incarcerations.
Moreover, the rule, as
constructed, does not reflect the full spectrum of values and rights that a
specific wrongful incarceration exception should aim to uphold.
To begin, Miller’s argument depends on prison statistics indicating
that incarceration presents heightened exposure to bodily harm. Although
prisons today certainly include high risks of violence and disease, and this
Comment does not intend to minimize the real-world danger of such risks,
assume for a moment that prison did not involve a greater risk of harm than
a non-incarcerated life. Still, inmates would be confined to prison cells, day
after day, drudging through the monotony of an imprisoned life. As
inmates, they would not have regular access to their families, and, as often
happens, hundreds of miles would separate them from loved ones.
Moreover, they would lead a depersonalized existence with little privacy, as
passersby could gaze into their cells to watch them eat, sleep, or use the
toilet.86 Although they would be subjected to no more or less of a risk of
substantial bodily harm than the average American citizen, the constricted
lifestyle, the monotony, and the lack of opportunity to establish careers,
relationships, and hobbies would detract from their quality of life.
Under such conditions, an attorney would not be able to come forward
with information that would help exonerate an innocent inmate under
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1). Since the inmate was not exposed to substantial
bodily harm, there would be no current rule that could save him. Thus, an
inmate like Alton Logan could spend twenty-six years in prison while an
84
Id. at 398-99 (citing Burden of Innocence Frequently Asked Questions, FRONTLINE,
May 1, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/burden/etc/faqsreal.html (“Studies
by the Life After Exoneration Project found that over 90 percent of exonerees lost all their
assets—savings, vehicles, houses—while imprisoned.”)).
85
Id. at 398.
86
SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 68 (8th ed. 2007)
(citing Richard A. Wright, Prisons: Prisoners, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
1182 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002)).
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attorney would be obligated to remain quiet. This hypothetical, though
extreme, illustrates a shortcoming in focusing only on the bodily harm
involved in imprisonment. It is not only that prisoners are exposed to
substantial bodily harm, but also that they are limited from experiencing the
freedom and autonomy that a wrongful incarceration exception should seek
to protect.
Second, in arguing that a wrongful incarceration exception should be
read into the substantial bodily harm exception, Professor Miller incorrectly
assumes that the risk of an inmate facing substantial bodily harm is
commensurate with the risk a lawyer must analyze when determining
whether his client will likely harm an intended victim.87 The difference
between these two risks, however, is that in one scenario, the attorney has a
direct relationship with the person aiming to do the harm—his client—and,
therefore, has some direct understanding of the intended victim’s risk of
harm. In the other scenario, where an attorney seeks to free an innocent
inmate, her only gauge of the inmate’s risk of harm is a set of prison
statistics. The attorney who believes her client intends to do harm can
converse with her client, attempt to dissuade him from the planned
wrongdoing, and measure the likelihood that harm will ensue without
further intervention. Under a wrongful incarceration situation, an attorney
has none of these tools to assess the likelihood of harm.
Despite these differences, Professor Miller argues that because lawyers
frequently gauge their clients’ behavior incorrectly, the risks are
commensurate.88 To support this conclusion, he cites a survey conducted
by Leslie Levin in 1994 of a set of New Jersey lawyers where fifty-two out
of the sixty-seven attorneys who believed that their clients were going to
commit specific wrongful acts likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm had at least one client who did not ultimately commit the
contemplated acts.89 However, Professor Miller failed to note that of those
fifty-two lawyers, 61.5% believed that they were responsible for dissuading
their clients from committing the wrongful act.90 These attorneys failed to
come forward not because they incorrectly gauged their clients’ intentions,
but because they understood their clients enough to dissuade them from
doing harm, thereby preventing the wrongdoing altogether. In fact, of the
sixty-seven lawyers who believed that their clients were going to commit
87

Miller, supra note 74, at 398.
Id.
89
Id. (citing Levin, supra note 47, at 111-12, 114 n.145).
90
Levin, supra note 47, at 119 nn.172-73 (“Twenty-eight out of 52 lawyers (53.3%)
believed that they dissuaded their clients by using reasoning other than the threat to disclose.
Another 7.7% thought that their clients did not commit the acts at least in part because the
attorneys had threatened to disclose.”).
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wrongful acts likely to result in future death or bodily injury, thirty-six had
valid reasons to conclude that disclosure was not necessary to prevent the
wrongful act.91 Only six lawyers reported that the wrongful acts did not
occur because they were wrong about their client’s intentions or their client
calmed down.92 Thus, Levin’s survey suggests that only 10% of lawyers
miscalculate their clients’ intentions to do harm.
The Comment to Model Rule 1.6 suggests that lawyers “may consider
such factors as the nature of the lawyer’s relationship with the client and
with those who might be injured by the client, [and] the lawyer’s own
involvement in the transaction”93 when exercising their discretion to come
forward with confidential information under Model Rule 1.6(b). Professor
Miller, however, would require attorneys to come forward with evidence
about a wrongful incarceration without any relationship with the actors
(fellow prisoners or security guards) who would likely impose substantial
bodily harm on the innocent inmate. Professor Miller assumes that
attorneys should come forward based strictly on nationwide statistics
describing conditions of incarceration. But, without performing any
specific research on the conditions of an inmate’s imprisonment, an
attorney could arguably never know with the “reasonabl[e] certain[ty]”94
required under Model Rule 1.6(b) that disclosing the confidential
information would prevent substantial bodily harm.
A wrongful
incarceration exception to attorney-client confidentiality should not require
an attorney to disclose only when they are reasonably certain that
substantial bodily harm might ensue. The exception should be provided for
situations in which an innocent is in prison or facing prison time for a crime
they did not commit, regardless of the bodily harm they may or may not
suffer, or the attorney’s knowledge of such harm.
Another shortcoming provided by reinterpreting the substantial bodily
harm exception to include wrongful incarceration is that the wording of
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) makes no distinction between saving an innocent or a
guilty person from suffering substantial bodily harm.95 In fact, by freeing
one inmate from suffering bodily harm in prison, an attorney places another
person, his own client, in the same conditions. In some scenarios, an
attorney’s disclosure could actually lead to his client’s receiving the death
91

Id. at 128-29 n.211. Thirty-two lawyers reported that they dissuaded their clients and
four reported that the client had no opportunity to commit the act. Id.
92
Id. at 129 n.211. It is unclear from the survey responses whether these lawyers
reached this conclusion before the wrongful act was supposed to occur—in which case there
was no duty to disclose—or afterwards. Id.
93
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (2008).
94
Id. R. 1.6(b)(1).
95
See id.
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penalty—a fate Dale Coventry, Andrew Wilson’s attorney in the Alton
Logan case, feared for his client if he were to reveal his guilt.96 Although
such punishment may be deserved, Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) makes no such
distinction. By remaining silent, therefore, attorneys prevent their own
clients from being exposed to the substantial bodily harm or reasonably
certain death presented by incarceration—and since Model Rule 1.6(b)(1)
seeks to prevent such harm without any limitation for the identity of the
victim, one could argue that the attorney who remains silent in fact adheres
to the principles propounded by the ethical rules.
Finally, although Miller’s argument would present an easy solution to
a complicated problem, it is simply impractical.97 Model Rule 1.6(b)(1),
and its state statute counterparts, has been interpreted for years not to
include a wrongful incarceration exception. It is doubtful that Miller’s
encouragement of a new interpretation would carry much weight, as judges
would likely continue to read the rule consistently with its original
meaning.98 Moreover, even if judges interpreted the bodily harm exception
to include wrongful incarcerations, there may be situations where
incarceration did not produce reasonable certainty of bodily harm, in which
case, the exception would not help the innocent. A new rule promulgated
by the legislature would carry much more weight as a clear signal of a new
intent to protect the wrongfully incarcerated specifically. To the extent that
Miller’s analysis suggests that states with bodily harm exception rules
should more comfortably adopt a wrongful incarceration exception,
recognizing some of the overlap in values protected in each, his arguments
are instructive. However, a better solution would be the enactment of a new
and clear rule that would properly accommodate the host of issues
presented by a wrongful incarceration exception to attorney-client
confidentiality.
C. MINIMUM SENTENCE REQUIREMENTS

In enacting a new rule, one of the practical issues presented by a
possible wrongful incarceration exception is whether it should only apply
when innocents have been sentenced to terms of a specified minimum
number of years. Alton Logan’s life sentence—and his twenty-six year
imprisonment—is an extreme case for which many argue there was a moral
mandate to come forward. But what happens when an innocent inmate is
sentenced to thirty days, or just one day? Is the moral prerogative still just
96

Miner, supra note 2.
Julia Thomas-Fishburn, Attorney-Client Confidences: Punishing the Innocent, 61
U. COLO. L. REV. 185, 208 (1990).
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Id.
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as strong when the prison term is reduced? If not, then at what point should
lawyers come forward?
Physical violence and rape can and do occur as soon as the first day of
incarceration.99 As such, if the moral prerogative is to save an innocent
person from substantial bodily harm—as the Model Rules currently
suggest100 and Professor Miller strongly advocates—then an attorney should
arguably be given the right to come forward with exculpatory evidence
even for a single day of undeserved confinement. Moreover, the social
stigma, financial loss, and impingement on freedom associated with
incarceration may be severe enough to warrant an attorney’s right to come
forward with exonerating information for any length of wrongful
confinement.
Allowing an attorney the right to come forward to prevent an innocent
person from serving any length of time in prison provides the attorney with
the opportunity to properly weigh the issues presented by wrongful
incarceration against a breach of confidentiality with his own client. Any
rule that sets a predetermined sentence requirement before allowing
disclosure risks exposing innocent people to the hazards presented by
incarceration.
Setting an arbitrary cut-off (for example, allowing
disclosures only in the case of felony convictions) would impose unfair
distinctions among innocent people serving time for offenses they did not
commit. Those serving shorter sentences would have no avenue for
recourse in the law, even though they were equally innocent of a crime they
did not commit.
Certainly, allowing attorneys the right to come forward will not always
translate into an attorney’s decision to come forward in those jurisdictions
that adopt discretionary disclosure rules. In extreme situations, where
disclosing confidential information would save an innocent person from
serving a year in prison but would land one’s client in prison for life,101
many attorneys may decide to remain silent. Even in less severe situations,
attorneys may choose not to disclose confidential information, weighing
99

United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 421 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“A
youthful inmate can expect to be subjected to homosexual gang rape his first night in jail, or,
it has been said, even in the van on the way to jail.”); Christopher D. Man & John P. Cronan,
Forecasting Sexual Abuse in Prison: The Prison Subculture of Masculinity as a Backdrop
for “Deliberate Indifference,” 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 127, 153-54, 169-71 (2001)
(citing Donna Brorby, Remarks at the “Not Part of the Penalty”: Ending Prisoner Rape
Conference (Oct. 19, 2001)).
100
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6.
101
Such a scenario may be likely in a three-strikes rule state, where one additional felony
conviction could land a client in jail for life while saving an innocent inmate without any
prior convictions from serving just a year. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(b) (West
2009).
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client confidentiality as the paramount value. A discretionary rule would
allow attorneys this right, providing them the flexibility to weigh the issues
on each side and determine the best course of action. Although a
mandatory rule would ensure that the innocent were protected under any
circumstances and would create consistency between cases, it would come
at the expense of a client’s trust and attorney confidence. The current
exceptions to client confidentiality already indicate that such trust should
not be easily discarded, affording attorneys the discretion to come forward
even in cases where a victim may be the subject of substantial bodily
harm.102 Such discretion is afforded because of the difficulty of the issues
at stake, and the importance of confidentiality and candid discussion against
nearly any value. Similarly, a wrongful incarceration exception should
afford attorneys the same opportunity, in recognition of the values involved
in choosing either to disclose or to remain silent.
D. PROCEDURAL ISSUES: THE RIGHT TIME TO DISCLOSE

In considering whether to disclose confidences about a wrongful
incarceration, an attorney must consider the proper time within the judicial
process to disclose the information. Professor Miller asserts that attorneys
should be able to disclose client information at some point during the
pretrial period because of the large percentage of defendants detained even
before trial begins.103 Since such detention risks exposure to substantial
bodily harm, attorneys should be able to come forward before the trial has
even begun based on the policies propounded by Model Rule 1.6(b)(1).
Additionally, Miller asserts, assuming the large costs of litigation, those
states that permit or require attorneys to disclose client information to
prevent substantial injury to the financial interest of another should allow
attorneys to come forward as early as the pretrial phase of the
proceedings.104
A mandatory disclosure rule that requires attorneys to immediately
come forward with exonerating information could seriously hurt a client’s
case.105 For example, in the midst of a trial in which an attorney’s own
client is being tried, the immediate disclosure rule would require the
attorney to disclose potentially damning confidential information about his
102

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6.
Miller, supra note 74, at 398.
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Id. at 398-99.
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The mandatory death or substantial bodily harm disclosure rule is the minority rule,
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Brooks Holland, Confidentiality and Candor Under the 2006 Washington Rules of
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client in order to save an innocent co-defendant from serving any time in
prison. A rule that would require such disclosure could violate a client’s
right against self incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, discussed in
more detail in Part III.E.
Under a discretionary rule, most attorneys would likely rather wait
until the trial is over before coming forward with evidence, even if the
innocent defendant was being detained pretrial. By waiting, there is still
some hope that justice will be served and the innocent defendant will only
be temporarily detained. Similarly, in cases where the client is not
detained, but stands to spend a significant amount of money on litigation
expenses, most lawyers would probably refrain from coming forward until
the completion of the trial. In fact, in situations where lawyers could
prevent financial injury or property damage to another by disclosing client
confidences, a study suggested that only 9% of lawyers chose to disclose.106
Attorneys, it seems, are reluctant to break confidentiality with their clients
in order to prevent financial injury, and there is no reason to believe that
such reluctance would not also apply during pretrial proceedings, even
when the large expense of litigation looms.
Then again, despite attorneys’ reluctance to disclose information
during or before trial, once an innocent defendant has been sentenced it can
be quite difficult to appeal his conviction. Most prosecutors “genuinely . . .
believe in the guilt of persons that a jury has found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.”107 Once a defendant is convicted, the presumption of
innocence fades, and any protective posture the prosecutor might adopt
towards a defendant pretrial disappears.108 Moreover, “[a]s a policy matter,
the reopening of a closed . . . case invites public distrust of the accuracy of
the criminal justice system.”109 New evidence “often lack[s] the ring of
truth” and may be considered a last ditch effort on the part of the convict
himself to avoid (continued) incarceration.110
106

Levin, supra note 47, at 129-30. New Jersey’s rule requires that an attorney reveal
“such information to the proper authorities, as soon as, and to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary, to prevent the client . . . from committing a criminal, illegal
or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in . . . substantial
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Presumably, defense attorneys understand the difficulty of introducing
new information to exonerate a client. Their reluctance to come forward
early in a proceeding should be balanced with the difficulty in helping an
innocent defendant once he or she has been convicted. Ultimately,
attorneys are in the best position to do such balancing since they have all
the information in front of them. Requiring disclosure at a certain point
could either seriously jeopardize a client’s case or could greatly impede a
postconviction actual innocence claim, depending on when the disclosure
was made. Attorneys should be given the discretion to weigh properly the
concerns presented on each side of the timing decision. Although this could
present inconsistency amongst different cases, it is the only way of ensuring
that proper consideration is given to the myriad values at stake.
E. SELF-INCRIMINATION AND USE IMMUNITY

By breaking confidentiality and disclosing incriminating information
about her client, an attorney arguably violates her client’s Fifth Amendment
rights. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “prevents
the use, in a criminal prosecution, of a defendant’s testimony elicited by
compulsion.”111 In a wrongful incarceration scenario, the Fifth Amendment
right is triggered not by a client’s compelled incriminating testimony, but
by his attorney’s disclosure of confidential incriminating statements in a
criminal prosecution against his client. The reason the constitutional right
is triggered is in part because a client who “makes an unwarned confession
to . . . his lawyer is entitled to believe that he is speaking to someone who is
acting ‘solely in his interest’ in a relationship of trust and confidence.”112 If
an attorney then breaks that trust and reveals incriminating information
about his client, the client’s personal privilege against self-incrimination is
violated. Moreover, a client is entitled to be free from being made “the
deluded instrument[] of his own conviction.”113 An attorney who reveals
incriminating, privileged information against his client’s will is
incriminating him in a way that violates his constitutional rights.
In Fisher v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized the
relationship between the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination and the attorney-client privilege.114 The Supreme Court held
that an attorney could not be compelled to break the attorney-client
privilege and produce incriminating information about his client that would

111
112
113
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Subin, supra note 50, at 1120.
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 190.
Id. (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467 (1981)).
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violate his Fifth Amendment rights.115 The Court highlighted the
importance and purpose of the attorney-client privilege to “encourage
clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”116 Fisher established that
if the information
would have been protected by the Fifth Amendment in the hands of the clients, [it]
must continue to be protected (by the attorney-client privilege) in the hands of the
lawyer. . . . [O]therwise[,] defendants would de facto lose whatever Fifth Amendment
protection they originally had, as a “penalty” for communicating with their
117
lawyers.

In order to avoid the Fifth Amendment constitutional violations
triggered by an attorney’s disclosure of a wrongful incarceration, use
immunity should be offered as a corollary right under a wrongful
incarceration exception. Use immunity, which protects clients from the use
of compelled testimony (or any information derived from that testimony) in
a future criminal prosecution,118 is provided in situations in which the
overriding values of the public interest in criminal investigation require that
an attorney disclose incriminating and privileged information.119 Use
immunity would protect any incriminating information revealed by the
attorney against his client’s wishes from being used against the client in a
criminal prosecution. Therefore, an attorney’s disclosure of a wrongful
incarceration would help the innocent by providing exonerating
information, while offering no new evidence against a client in a criminal
prosecution against him. Since the Fifth Amendment does not bar the
revelation of incriminating testimony—it only prohibits using the
information in a criminal prosecution—use immunity could effectively
protect a client’s Fifth Amendment rights even if his attorney disclosed
confidential, incriminating information.120 Additionally, in those situations
where a client knowingly and voluntarily waived the attorney-client
privilege, and granted his attorney permission to reveal confidences, there
would be no Fifth Amendment violation, and therefore no need for use
immunity’s protection.

115

Id. at 403-05.
Id. at 403.
117
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In order to preserve a prosecution’s already existing case against a
client, use immunity would only protect information that the attorney
received from the client for legal assistance purposes and that the
prosecution had not already acquired. Any information that the prosecution
gathered independently would be unprotected. The prosecution could
therefore bring a case against a guilty client if it could prove the case
without using any immunized information.121 Thus, a case that was already
being developed against a client need not suddenly be dropped when an
attorney comes forward with a confession. This tool would only be
available in cases where the prosecution had already gathered sufficient
evidence to prosecute, so that an attorney’s decision to disclose would not
necessarily save a client who already feared prosecution.
Use immunity would thus protect a client’s constitutional rights and
would provide attorneys some comfort in deciding to disclose client
confidences. Such safety would not come without any expense. Use
immunity would grant guilty people a get out-of-jail-free card by
potentially allowing self-confessing criminals to go unpunished for a crime
they committed. Such impunity would be a tough pill for victims and their
family members to swallow, as they would have no way of seeking
retribution in cases where only immunized information was available. Most
disturbingly, use immunity risks that guilty people with a propensity for
crime will be free to commit crimes again. Despite these serious
drawbacks, use immunity may be the only option available under a
wrongful incarceration exception that would avoid constitutional violations.
Regardless of the form a wrongful-incarceration exception rule takes, use
immunity is a necessary, if not perfect, safeguard to ensure a client’s
constitutional rights are protected.
F. THE IMPACT OF A NEW RULE ON ATTORNEYS’ BEHAVIOR

Although there are several concerns that would require consideration
before introducing a new exception to attorney-client confidentiality, one of
the main practical issues is whether it would ultimately make any difference
in lawyers’ behavior. Massachusetts is currently the only state that has a
wrongful incarceration exception. Comment 9A to the Massachusetts Rule
explains that the exception “permits a lawyer to reveal confidential
information in the specific situation where such information discloses that
an innocent person has been convicted of a crime and has been sentenced to
imprisonment or execution.”122 As of the writing of this Comment, I could
121

Id. at 1176-77.
MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) cmt. 9A (2008) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/rpcnet.htm.
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find no reported instances of a lawyer making a disclosure under this rule.
Although it is possible that there have been no cases to report, it might very
well be that lawyers are choosing to remain silent despite the exception.
Dale Coventry, for example, who remained silent for so many years while
Logan served time in jail, explained his actions by reasoning that his
ultimate obligation was to his client.123 Under a discretionary rule, it is
questionable whether Coventry would have disclosed his client’s confession
any earlier, since his client’s trust was his most important concern. Such
trust should not be undermined nor discounted, but ultimately, the lack of
impact caused by a discretionary rule should be considered.
There is some evidence that even a mandatory rule would not make
much of a difference in lawyers’ behavior.124 According to Leslie Levin’s
study of New Jersey lawyers, only about half of the lawyers who were
required to disclose under New Jersey’s Rule of Professional Conduct
1.6(b) to prevent death or substantial bodily harm actually made
disclosures.125 Although lawyers offered a number of reasons for not
disclosing client information to prevent harm to another, most of these
reasons related to a basic disagreement with the disclosure rule.126 Also, the
lawyers who did not disclose client information to prevent harm often
indicated that they did not do so because of the perceived importance of
maintaining client trust.127 For example, one public defender noted, “Once
you lose your reputation for fighting for your client regardless of the
information that you receive from him, it leaves you in a vulnerable
position.”128 On the other hand, virtually all of the lawyers who came
forward and disclosed client information to prevent substantial harm
indicated they would have disclosed even if disclosure were optional under
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the New Jersey rule.129 Although the mandatory rule seemed to have some
effect on attorneys, the primary reason lawyers came forward was concern
for the intended victim.130 Taken together, it is questionable whether even a
mandatory rule would result in changes in attorneys’ behavior: if lawyers
disagree with the rules, then they may remain silent regardless.
Part of the reason lawyers can remain silent despite mandatory rules is
because it is nearly impossible to police their behavior. If both a client and
his attorney remain silent about a confession, then there is virtually no way
to regulate the attorney’s conduct. Under such conditions, attorneys may be
more likely to behave according to what they believe is right or wrong,
instead of what the ethical guidelines require. In fact, Jamie Kunz, one of
Andrew Wilson’s lawyers, claimed that if Alton Logan had faced the death
chamber instead of life in prison, she would have come forward regardless
of the statutory ethical rules.131 There is some evidence that clients, even
those who understand confidentiality rules to be absolute, believe that their
lawyers will behave according to their personal sense of what should be
kept confidential.132 Finally, disciplinary committees presiding over such
situations may not apply the ethical rules rigidly, understanding that certain
situations deserve some leniency.133 For example, Dale Coventry and Jamie
Kunz were never disciplined for coming forward with their confidential
information, even though there was some question as to whether Andrew
Wilson really gave them permission to disclose his confession upon his
death.134 Similarly, although Staple Hughes was referred to the North
129
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Carolina State Bar for violating the attorney-client privilege, the bar
ultimately threw out the complaint.135 Professor Abbe Smith notes,
[I]n the rare case where it is truly necessary to disclose information obtained through
the lawyer-client relationship (to stop the wrong person from being executed, to
prevent premeditated murder, to prevent mayhem), a lawyer will do so
136
notwithstanding the principle, and . . . the lawyer will not be disciplined for it.

This suggests that disciplinary committees are likely to avoid penalizing
lawyers in the most egregious cases—which, under a discretionary rule (and
perhaps, even a mandatory rule based on Levin’s study), may be the only
time lawyers would come forward anyway.
Even so, it is hard to gauge how many lawyers do not come forward
strictly because a rule does not exist. Although there is some evidence that
a rule does not necessarily produce lawyer disclosure, it is unclear how
many lawyers remain silent because of fear of discipline or sanction. This
is particularly true for lawyers who would come forward in cases where an
innocent person served time in jail for a short period, if a rule existed. In
those cases, the threat of discipline, or of hurting one’s reputation, may be
more severe. A rule that would allow or require attorneys to come forward
in such a situation may reduce that threat. Then again, the history of
Massachusetts’s experience certainly casts doubt on the reliability of a rule
to change attorney conduct. Whether or not a rule necessarily results in
change, however, there is value in creating a rule as an assertion of the
principles we believe are important, and as a declaration of the rights
lawyers should have (whether or not they choose to exercise those rights) if
they have confidential information that would exonerate an innocent
inmate.
G. THE BENEFITS OF A NEW DISCRETIONARY RULE

Public response to wrongful incarcerations and executions reflects
deep resentment and disapproval of this very serious flaw in the judicial
system.137 In addition to DNA testing, which helps exonerate the innocent,
a wrongful incarceration exception could add another safeguard for
innocent men and women.138 The media explosion and the subsequent
public disgust with Alton Logan’s twenty-six-year incarceration139 suggest
that the public would favor an exception. Although there are various issues
135
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involved in introducing an exception, the public’s outrage is certainly a
factor to consider in the decision to promulgate a new rule, since after all,
lawyers’ ultimate purpose is to represent the public.140
Several proposals have already been presented. Professor Miller’s
contribution—the reinterpretation of the substantial bodily harm exception
discussed above in Part III.B—certainly raises valuable and significant
considerations.141 His strongest argument comes through the Model Rules’
assertion that the prevention of substantial bodily harm is a concern that
overrides confidentiality.142 However, his argument overlooks the fact that
the substantial bodily harm exception is simply not designed to protect the
wrongfully incarcerated. In those situations where wrongful incarceration
does not include substantial bodily harm, or where lawyers simply cannot
gauge with reasonable certainty whether a prisoner would be subjected to
bodily harm, the substantial bodily harm exception would not help.
Additionally, the wording of the substantial bodily harm exception does not
accommodate the wrongful incarceration situation, as it places no limitation
on the identity of the person harmed, such that placing one’s client in jail in
place of the innocent actually violates the rule. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, judges simply have not interpreted the substantial bodily harm
exception to include a wrongful incarceration exception, and, in the absence
of specific legislative action to protect the wrongfully incarcerated, it is
unlikely that judges will add new meaning to the rule.
Another proposal was suggested by Criminal Justice Section Ethics,
Gideon & Professionalism Committee co-chairs Bruce Green and Ellen
Yaroshevsky.143 Their proposal to amend Model Rule 1.6 allows disclosure
of confidential information in cases of a wrongful conviction only if an
attorney’s client is already deceased: “[a] lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation of a deceased client to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent or rectify the wrongful conviction
of another.”144 The drafters recognized the difficulty in allowing disclosure
before a client’s death; as noted in the comment to the proposed rule, “[t]he
interests underlying the confidentiality obligation are usually paramount in
the case of living clients because clients will not be as forthcoming if there
is a risk that their confidences will be disclosed during their lifetimes.”145
However, the drafters add, “the societal interest in disclosure may be
paramount when the client is deceased, particularly when the client’s
140
141
142
143
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reputation and estate will not be prejudiced by disclosure.”146 Green and
Yaroshevsky’s proposal reflects a movement forward in the wake of the
Alton Logan and Lee Wayne Hunt cases, but their proposed exception
would do nothing to prevent people in similar situations from serving yearslong sentences before the true criminals died. While closing the door on
some issues, their proposal leaves significant concerns unanswered.
Legislatures should adopt a wrongful incarceration exception to
attorney-client confidentiality that is available to attorneys even before a
client’s death. The values involved in freeing the innocent from undeserved
prison sentences should be recognized as too weighty to overlook even in
the face of the long revered benefits of confidentiality. Incarceration robs
innocent people of their freedom, exposes them so often to disease and
physical violence, and diminishes their ability to lead meaningful lives.
Incarcerating the innocent goes against the very goals implicit in a judicial
system—to punish wrongdoers, impose order, and establish justice. A
wrongful incarceration exception should be promulgated as an assertion of
society’s values in preserving the freedom of the innocent.
Though not a solution to all of the issues raised in this Comment, the
best rule is one that would allow lawyers the discretion to disclose
confidential information of a wrongful incarceration. A discretionary rule
would allow an attorney to decide when to come forward during a
proceeding—whether pretrial, mid-trial, or after conviction—balancing the
possible financial and bodily harm imposed on the innocent throughout the
course of a proceeding and the harm caused to his client by disclosure.
Similarly, a discretionary rule would allow an attorney to decide whether to
come forward with confidential information even when it would save an
innocent from serving just a short sentence.
Ultimately, disclosing information early in a proceeding or saving an
innocent defendant from serving a very short sentence, could result in grave
consequences to the defense attorney’s reputation and client loyalty and
trust. Recognizing that disclosing each and every time a wrongful
incarceration was presented could chill discussions with their clients over
time, attorneys may use their discretion in choosing to disclose only when
the benefits of disclosure are significant. At the same time, coming forward
too late could result in the media backlash that Coventry, Kunz, and Hughes
faced (though, it is unclear whether their professional careers have been
impacted by their decision to keep confidences for so long), and perhaps
most importantly, could weigh heavily on lawyers’ consciences. Since
there is some evidence that clients do not know or understand the
exceptions to confidentiality, and assume anyway that attorneys will
146
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disclose information if they feel morally compelled to do so, a new rule for
wrongful incarcerations may not chill discussions at all. However, to the
extent that it would chill discussions or destroy confidences, a discretionary
rule would regulate such decisions by forcing attorneys to take into
consideration the effect on their client before coming forward with
confidences. Although a mandatory disclosure rule would make a decision
to disclose easier, and could promote consistency in lawyers’ response to
wrongful incarcerations, it would ultimately detract from the values at stake
while making a very complicated decision a black-and-white one. A
discretionary rule gives attorneys the opportunity to fully respect the issues
at stake and decide the best route.
Giving attorneys discretion to disclose is not a foreign concept in the
ethical guidelines. The current exceptions to confidentiality in the Model
Rules afford an attorney great leeway in the decision to disclose
confidential information. The exceptions allowing attorneys to reveal
information concerning future crimes “have been given very broad
discretion with virtually no definition of the provisions’ terms and
scope.”147 The Massachusetts rule allowing disclosure to prevent “the
wrongful execution or incarceration of another” provides no guidance as to
when an attorney should come forward.148 Such discretion suggests that
attorneys, in the end, are in the best position to regulate such decisions.
Although the Massachusetts rule has produced no disclosures so far, the
lack of disclosure could simply signify that lawyers are weighing the issues
at stake against disclosure. Such a decision should not necessarily be
discounted as wrong. In fact, even Alton Logan, who served so many years
in prison for a crime Andrew Wilson committed, claimed upon his release
that “Andrew Wilson’s attorney did nothing wrong. They did their job.”149
Attorney-client confidentiality may in fact be that important to the legal
profession, and even the wrongfully incarcerated understand that.
The American judicial system does not generally impose a duty on
attorneys to come forward with evidence in cases where they are not
representing any parties.150 In fact, more broadly speaking, there is no
general obligation for persons to report crimes.151 Although lawyers have
147
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assumed certain responsibilities as advocates before the law, “they have
hardly agreed to become law enforcement officers.”152 Requiring lawyers
to come forward regardless of the effects on their client would cause a
fundamental shift in the legal profession. Legal representation should
always allow an attorney to consider, at the very least, the possible negative
effects of his actions on his client before disclosing confidences. Without
allowing such space for client consideration, lawyers would become yet
another actor in the law enforcement system, and client representation
would ultimately suffer.
Regardless of the form a wrongful incarceration exception takes—
whether discretionary or mandatory—if an attorney does come forward, use
immunity should be employed to safeguard a client’s constitutional rights
against self-incrimination. Thus, any information that was revealed against
the client’s wishes could not be used against him in a court of law. Of
course, an attorney’s disclosure could not prevent a client from being
prosecuted when existing information about him would be enough to
prosecute him, but an attorney could still more comfortably reveal
confidences knowing some safeguards were available. More importantly, a
client’s constitutional rights would be protected.
A discretionary rule certainly has drawbacks, but it is the best option to
handle the numerous competing interests involved. Any black letter law
that sets in stone when, if, and under what circumstances an attorney should
come forward would not take into account all of the values at stake. A
discretionary rule with few exacting constraints is the only option that
would reflect the gravity of issues presented. Inherent in a discretionary
rule is the possibility that lawyers will choose not to come forward, but it is
a price that many jurisdictions with similar discretionary rules to prevent
substantial bodily harm and imminent death already choose to pay in order
to ensure that clients are given effective representation. Similarly, it is a
price worth paying in the case of wrongful incarcerations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Wrongful incarcerations are one of the most tragic products of a
judicial system. Often, they are impossible to avoid as judges and juries
imposing punishment are exposed to only so much information and are,
after all, only human. But when exonerating information is available and
wrongful incarcerations continue to occur, there is a sharp sense of failure
in the system. Although lawyers are trained to serve clients, bound by
confidentiality restraints to preserve their innermost secrets, it seems that
some secrets are simply too costly to bear. Saving the innocent from
152
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serving time in prison is a value that deserves recognition in the law in spite
of the recognized benefits of attorney-client confidentiality.
Still, the issues involved in breaking confidentiality to save the
wrongfully incarcerated are complex. Clients arguably should not be
penalized for revealing incriminating information to their attorneys—
information that they would have kept hidden if it were not for a promise of
confidentiality. A wrongful incarceration exception could thus chill the
very discussions that contribute to an attorney’s knowledge of exonerating
information. Adding yet another exception to confidentiality could silence
clients when their honesty and openness are most important. In fact,
without knowing a client’s full story, an attorney may be prevented from
providing the effective assistance clients so need.
In addition to the dangers presented by an exception to attorney-client
confidentiality, a wrongful incarceration exception raises issues involved in
the timing of disclosure. When is the right time to disclose and should
disclosure happen regardless of the sentence imposed? Is freeing the
innocent an overriding value in every circumstance, regardless of the effect
on a client—and on legal assistance as a whole? This Comment suggests
that such value judgments are best left to attorneys representing their
clients. A discretionary rule for wrongful incarceration disclosures is the
best option that allows for the most recognition of the values at stake. By
allowing attorneys to weigh the issues presented before disclosing, clients’
rights are recognized, while the innocent are still provided some hope of
recourse in the law. In recognition of the lives of innocent men and women
serving in prisons, states should adopt a discretionary wrongful
incarceration exception to attorney-client confidentiality ethical rules.
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